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Abstract 
Although the notion of wellbeing is popular in contemporary literature, it is variously 
interpreted and has no common definition. Such inconsistencies in definition have 
particular relevance when considering wellbeing programs designed for children. By 
developing a broader conceptualisation of wellbeing and its key elements, the range of 
programs and services developed in the name of wellbeing will achieve a more consistent 
cross-disciplinary focus to ensure that the needs of the individual, including children, can 
more accurately be addressed. This paper presents a new perspective on conceptualising 
wellbeing. The authors argue that conceptualising wellbeing as an accrued process has 
particular relevance for both adults and children. A definition for accrued wellbeing is 
presented in an attempt to address some of the current deficiencies in existing 
understandings of an already complicated construct. The potential for the ideas presented 
when considering wellbeing as a process of accrual may have further application when 
considered beyond childhood.  
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Wellbeing as a process of accrual: beyond subjectivity and 
beyond the moment 
Introduction 
While popular in contemporary literature, the notion of wellbeing is variously interpreted 
and as such has become a ubiquitous term for all things health related within the 
community. It is somewhat perplexing that despite its wide use and application across a 
range of disciplines, wellbeing reflects many of the elements of “buzzword” status that 
can undermine the efficacy of programs applied in its name. An assumed knowledge of 
the wellbeing intent for each program is required as evidenced through the varying 
application for wellbeing in terms of physical capacity, emotional capacity, spiritual 
capacity, cognitive capacity or simply as a substitute for “mental health” (La Placa, 
McNaught, & Knight 2013). Such demarcations, while expeditious do little to help shape 
a holistic view of wellbeing that extends beyond the sum of its parts. When considering 
the plethora of wellbeing enhancement programs available, it is apparent that a definition 
of wellbeing that is applicable across a range of domains is required, if only so that 
wellbeing programs can be objectively measured according to common criteria. 
Wellbeing in its broadest sense encompasses all aspects of the human experience as 
perceived by an individual at any given time. The key elements of wellbeing have been 
extensively debated in the philosophical, health, psychological and economic literature 
and in the absence of an agreed definition for wellbeing (Dear, Henderson & Korten, 
2002; La Placa, McNaught & Knight, 2013; McAllister, 2005; McNaught, 2011, Watson, 
2010) researchers apply definitions based on their discipline imperatives. For example, 
McAllister defines wellbeing as 
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More than the absence of illness or pathology; it has subjective (self-assessed) and 
objective (ascribed) dimensions; it can be measured at the level of individuals or 
society, it accounts for elements of life satisfaction that cannot be defined, 
explained or primarily influenced by economic growth. (2005, p. 2) 
Shah and Marks (2004, p. 2) define wellbeing as “more than just happiness. As well as 
feeling satisfied and happy, wellbeing means developing as a person, being fulfilled, and 
making a contribution to the community.” While Dodge, Daly, Huyton and Sanders 
(2012, p. 230) define wellbeing as “the balance point between an individual’s resource 
pool and the challenges faced.” There is also contention as to whether wellbeing should 
be considered a construct (Seligman, 2011) or a state (Dodge et al., 2012). Further to this, 
much contemporary research broadly applies wellbeing across social, physical, cognitive, 
environmental/economic and psychological domains (Fraillon, 2004; Hattie, Myers & 
Sweeney, 2004; Hill, 2004; Keyes & Lopez, 2002; La Placa, McNaught & Knight, 2013; 
Pollard & Lee, 2003; Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff & Singer, 1998; Schickler, 2005). 
Moreover, Pollard and Lee (2003, p. 60) describe wellbeing as “a complex, multifaceted 
construct that has contributed to elude researchers’ attempts to define and measure.” 
Carlisle and Hanlon (2008, p. 265) are more critical in describing wellbeing as “an ill-
defined and distracting red herring for those concerned with improving health.” This 
definitional conundrum reflects the interdisciplinary nature of wellbeing and the priorities 
of each field of endeavour. As Michalos (2008, p. 354) states “human wellbeing is too 
multifaceted to be captured by a single discipline” which results in repeated 
interdisciplinary critical discussions about what wellbeing actually means. Despite the 
expressed discontent across many fields, the term wellbeing remains in common use and 
as such demands a greater level of clarity in definition. 
 When considering specific aspects of wellbeing as applied across disciplines it is 
apparent that an individual can experience, simultaneously, both positive and negative 
wellbeing, that can further cloud an individual overall assessment at any given time 
(Diener & Oishi, 2005; Fattore et. al, 2007; Kim-Prieto, Diener, Tamir, Scollon & Diener, 
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2005; Pollard & Lee, 2003; Weston, 1999). Just as an individual could experience 
positive physical wellbeing – optimal physical health and enjoy a healthy and nutritious 
diet combined with exercise, they may, at the same time experience low social wellbeing 
exhibiting depression, negative self-concept or suicidal ideation. To explain persons 
overall wellbeing in such a case would present a challenge in any discipline, particularly 
when the available definitions of wellbeing vary so widely. This individual’s present 
sense or expression of wellbeing does not fit neatly within the available descriptions of 
wellbeing that focus predominantly on the presence of positive traits and attributes. While 
such definitions may suitably describe an individual’s physical ‘wellbeing’ or ‘being 
well’, it is clear that wellbeing is significantly more than merely ‘being well’ (Schickler, 
2005).  
This definitional conundrum reflects the interdisciplinary nature of wellbeing and the 
priorities of each field of endeavour. As Jones and Sumner, (2009 p. 33) assert, 
definitions of wellbeing are ambiguous and “contested in the literature” difficulties that 
support the arguments of Fattore, Mason and Watson (2007 p. 11) who state that 
“wellbeing is socially contingent, a construct embedded in society and culture and prone 
to change and redefinition over time.” Crivello, Camfield and Woodhead (2009 p. 53) 
also note that, “wellbeing is an important but somewhat elusive concept… open to 
numerous definitions, conceptualisations and methodological approaches”. As with many 
socially constructed conditions and conventions, it is to be expected that periodical 
redefinitions of wellbeing can and should occur. However, without a baseline definition 
that is inclusive of the elements prioritised across disciplines, such a process of evolution 
and redefinition cannot begin, let alone evolve. Until such a focused conceptualisation of 
wellbeing is conducted the dilemmas of definition will remain. 
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Conceptualisations of wellbeing  
The focus on wellbeing has evolved from being one component of health to a field of 
holistic interest in its own right (Fraillon, 2004). Definitions incorporating wellbeing have 
developed from the traditional health-based underpinnings to a wider acknowledgement 
of the range of elements that contribute to its formation. A dilemma not apparent when 
considering the personalised features of subjective wellbeing. 
When considering the difficulties in defining the broad term ‘wellbeing’ (Dear, 
Henderson & Korten, 2002; La Placa, McNaught & Knight, 2013; McAllister, 2005; 
McNaught, 2011, Watson, 2010), some lessons are available from the clear definition of 
“subjective wellbeing.” Subjective Wellbeing (SWB) developed by Diener et al (1999 p. 
278) is defined as “a broad category of phenomena that includes people’s emotional 
responses, domain satisfactions, and global judgements of life satisfaction.” Importantly 
SWB is specific to a particular individual and is representative of a specified time period. 
Under an SWB framework, an individual’s reported level of wellbeing must be 
understood to be flexible and ever-changing (Watson, 2010; Weston, 1999) and likely to 
differ depending on contextual factors which are difficult, if not impossible, to control. 
An assessment of SWB at any given time should be considered with caution because 
firstly it contains a subjective account by an individual, and secondly will be most likely 
influenced by temporary affectations.  
Defining wellbeing in a way that relies upon temporary affectations such as those applied 
in subjective wellbeing assessments is not helpful when attempting to understand 
wellbeing as a holistic entity. These short-term appraisals do not permit the individual to 
draw upon the influences of previous experience in their determinations. Therefore, “it is 
more appropriate to regard subjective wellbeing as a fluctuating state rather than a stable 
trait” (Headley & Wearing, 1991, p. 56). However, when considering wellbeing as having 
the ability to transcend the temporary time dimension, it becomes a significantly more 
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stable trait. Temporary affectations focus on single experiences (either positive or 
negative), which makes it difficult for the individual to see beyond that reference point. 
Considering wellbeing as having the potential to be both a state and a trait may serve to 
have greater utility in the development of a workable definition. 
To assess subjective wellbeing, Diener et al (1999 p. 278) posited the multifaceted 
considerations of the physiological and psychological elements on the subjective 
judgements made arguing “although some might argue that SWB is, after all, subjective, 
it nevertheless depends on reactions in multiple physiological and psychological 
systems.” However despite the consolidation of multiple internal systems it remains 
apparent that considering isolated points in time is clearly not sufficient to inform a long 
term perspective of an individual’s social and emotional wellbeing beyond subjectivity.  
The lack of clarity in defining wellbeing may stem from the interchange of various 
expressions such as wellness, positive mental health and subjective wellbeing without 
distinction between them leading to a pervasive interchange of use in contemporary media 
and policy documents.  
Wellness is distinguished by its primary focus upon either the physical condition or the 
emotions and attitudes of an individual in response to a particular context. Ryan and 
Travis (1981 p. 3) define wellness as “the balanced flow between contrasting positions, 
attitudes, or emotions, rather than the attachment to any particular one… learning from 
each, growing from both.” Wellness does not however effectively reflect a person’s prior 
experience, developed resilience, or knowledge. Schickler further outlined the difference 
between wellness and wellbeing as,  
“being well as opposed to ill or diseased [is] not then the same as wellbeing, for 
the latter could occur in the presence of disease. Suffering [is] probably the 
opposite of wellbeing in that it could be present whether there was disease or 
‘wellness’.”. (2005, p. 222)  
Wellbeing is often described in mental health research as the interplay between both the 
presence of positive wellbeing and the absence of mental illness, not the presence or 
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absence of one component in isolation (Keyes, 2006; Keyes and Lopez, 2002; Ryff and 
Singer, 1998; Ryff, 1995).  The Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (2007) 
considers wellbeing as a social construct that is dependent on how an individual responds 
to negative inputs and builds their resilience from these experiences, further illustrating 
the distinctions between mental health and wellbeing. Keyes and Lopez (2002) noted that 
researchers in mental health research commonly investigate the dimensions of social, 
emotional, or psychological wellbeing, suggesting wellbeing is simply a synonym of 
mental health. 
The necessarily narrow definitions commonly provided when referring to wellness and 
positive mental health do not effectively apply to a lifespan notion of wellbeing. It is 
imperative therefore that the notion of wellbeing is further defined to encapsulate a long-
term perspective of wellness, wellbeing and positive mental health across the lifespan.  
As discussed previously, an individual’s perceived level of wellbeing is typically 
examined in terms of their subjective wellbeing and an individual’s evaluation of their 
own life (Diener, Lucas & Oishi, 2002; Keyes, 2006; Kim-Prieto et. al., 2005). Such 
evaluation entails an individual's recollection of events contributing to their subjective 
wellbeing assessment. However, Diener and Oishi (2005) outlined the importance of 
caution in recognising the nature of memory as an individual’s wellbeing is recreated 
from what can be recalled in addition to the effect that both temporary and long term 
situational changes have on an individual’s subjective wellbeing (White, 2007).  
To investigate the phenomenon of wellbeing further, an exploration into some of the 
interdisciplinary arguments about wellbeing within Philosophical, Health and 
Psychological literatures is necessary.  
Philosophical conceptualisations 
The notion of wellbeing, even in its most broad sense, has been theorised for centuries 
through the works of philosophers such as Aristotle and Epicurus (Kraut, 2010; Magee, 
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2010; O’Neill, 2006) and by asking “how one ought to live” (La Placa, McNaught & 
Knight, 2013, p. 116) and “what constitutes a good society” (Ryan & Deci, 2001, p. 
143).The historical origins of wellbeing being achieved through living a good life and the 
pursuit of happiness inform some of the contemporary debates on wellbeing.  
Aristotle questioned ethics and the nature of ‘being’, which led to theorising that 
ultimately humans want to “live well” (Kraut, 2010, para 6) and achieve a “happy life” 
(Magee, 2010, p.38). To do this, Aristotelian thought posits that man ultimately strives for 
eudemonia (happiness/bliss) as the “highest good” (Kraut, 2010, para 5). Aristotle 
questioned the purpose of life so humans could understand how eudemonia might be 
achieved. If the purpose or meaning of life is known, then the steps to achieve eudemonia 
can be identified and accomplished. Aristotle said “not that happiness is a virtue, but that 
it is a virtuous activity. Living well consists in doing something, not just being in a certain 
state or condition. It consists in those lifelong activities that actualise the virtues of the 
rational part of the soul” (Kraut, 2010, para 8).  
It could then be argued that the evaluation of wellbeing is never complete. As such, an 
individual’s holistic wellbeing may never truly be able to be objectively evaluated as 
complete, as it continues to evolve and respond to past and present conditions. Wellbeing 
may be considered the process of being by which eudemonia is achieved, which may have 
the ability be affected and influenced after death.  
By contrast, hedonic theories focus on maximising pleasure and minimising pain (Moore, 
2004) in order to achieve wellbeing. Hedonic theories explore the extent to which 
pleasure and pain underlie human action and motivation and, as O’Neill (2006, p. 162) 
explains,  
as far as our own well-being is concerned life before we existed is a mirror of life after we 
die. Neither matter to us. If well-being consists in having the right mental states of 
pleasure and the absence of pain, then neither what happens before or after we die can 
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affect our wellbeing. Hence both should be a matter of indifference to us as far as our own 
wellbeing is concerned.  
A significant hedonic perspective is found in Epicurean philosophy, which focuses on 
living an enjoyable life and acknowledges the importance of social aspects in achieving 
happiness. O’Neill (2006, p. 161) describes happiness as “a matter of securing those 
stable pleasures that could be realised among a small group of friends.” As with other 
hedonic theories, Epicurean philosophy ultimately aimed to “liberate people from fear, 
not only the fear of death but the fear of life. Ryan and Deci summarise the hedonistic and 
eudemonic positions on wellbeing in that  
hedonism ... reflects the view that wellbeing consists of pleasure of happiness. The second 
view [eudemonism] ... is that wellbeing consists of more than just happiness. It lies 
instead in the actualisation of human potentials ... [Both views] are founded on distinct 
views of human nature and what constitutes a good society. (2001, p. 143) 
The focus on wellbeing through life, however, would not be complete without an 
acknowledgement of death and dying, where the finality of the physical human 
experience for each individual occurs. The existentialist view challenges the ‘problem’ of 
death to equip individuals with the necessary perspective to live a meaningful life. 
Existentialist positioning on individual existence and wellbeing informs what Heidegger 
terms ‘being-toward-death’ (Hinman, 1978). The way an individual embraces and accepts 
mortality and imminent death is key to how the meaning in life is constructed until that 
time. How an individual constructs, responds to and explains experiences may contain 
inherently existential or spiritual rationales. Regardless of what an individual’s spiritual 
alignment may be, any points of being between birth and death can be considered in terms 
of being-toward-death, as death (at least of the physical body) signifies the finality of life.  
Even within the two very broad areas of Aristotelian (eudemonic) and Epicurean 
(hedonic) philosophies, contrasting views and opinions exist, particularly surrounding the 
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evaluation of wellbeing and the role of death in understanding it. The hedonic perspective 
may be broadly understood as defining wellbeing in terms of short-term gratification, with 
the intent that this gratification be continued as long as possible. Alternatively the 
eudemonic perspective presents wellbeing as more long-term and enduring. However, 
neither of these perspectives is completely supports a holistic view of wellbeing. While 
there are some similarities between these broad perspectives of wellbeing, there is no 
definitive conceptualisation. Even in contemporary discussions of wellbeing, there are 
difficulties in determining how wellbeing can be clearly defined.  
In contemporary discourse, the capabilities approach (Nussbaum, 2003; Sen, 1979) is 
frequently discussed within discourse about wellbeing in philosophy, and has been 
compared to a modern interpretation of Aristotelian philosophy on being as described 
above (O’Neill, 2006). The capabilities approach involved outlining a “social minimum... 
resources a person needs in order to lead a minimally decent life in their society” (White, 
2008, para 5). Nussbaum (2003) outlined 10 capabilities that she felt should be provided 
by each society as an entitlement and “opportunity for functioning.” The capabilities of; 
life, bodily health, bodily integrity, senses, imagination and thought, emotions, practical 
reason, affiliation, other species, play as well as political and material control over one’s 
environment were seen as essential for individual opportunities for optimal functioning, 
each capability being regulated to an extent by a nations political process (Nussbaum, 
2003 p. 418). These capabilities are explained in terms of “having a set of constitutional 
guarantees like those on this list, or based upon them, citizens would be informed from 
the beginning of life that there are certain entitlements that are particularly central, and 
deprivation of which is particularly tragic” (Nussbaum, 2003 p. 418). It is through an 
evaluation of these opportunities for functioning that an individual’s wellbeing could be 
established. 
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Health conceptualisations 
Much of the health literature identifies wellbeing as primarily focusing on the negative 
aspects of human experience (Ryff & Singer, 1998; Ryff, 1995). The term wellbeing is 
identified by Crisp (2008) as being used primarily within a health context, although 
Carlisle and Hanlon (2008 p. 265) argue “that if ‘health’ is to be used as a broad term 
encompassing both positive health (being well/well-being) and negative health (being ill), 
then the term ‘well-being’ becomes redundant.” This is in contrast to World Health 
Organisation’s (WHO) definition of health as “a state of complete physical, mental and 
social wellbeing and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (WHO, 1946 p. 100). 
This definition of health makes it apparent that domains of wellbeing are the components 
that constitute an individual’s health and suggests that health and “complete mental and 
physical wellbeing” are synonyms. As such, the domains of wellbeing may be considered 
symptoms of health which may render it difficult to determine what wellbeing actually is, 
let alone measure it (Adams, 2012; Dear, Henderson & Korten, 2002; McAllister, 2005; 
Pollard & Lee, 2003). Such a broad application is particularly problematic when 
developing and evaluating wellbeing programs for interest groups. 
Psychological conceptualisations 
An individual’s perceived level of overall wellbeing is typically examined in psychology 
in terms of their subjective wellbeing (Diener et al, 1999; Diener, Lucas & Oishi, 2002; 
Keyes, 2006; Kim-Prieto et al, 2005). Within health and psychological research, there has 
been a focus upon the negative aspects of human experience (Ryff & Singer, 1998; Ryff, 
1995). However, when measuring wellbeing for social, economic, cognitive and physical 
impact, Pollard and Lee (2003 p. 65) identify positive measurements of wellbeing while a 
deficit model was used when referring to psychological wellbeing. 
In psychological literature, there continues an ongoing debate between the hedonic and 
eudemonic perspectives of wellbeing (Deci & Ryan, 2008: Kashdan, Uswatte & Julian, 
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2006). Ryan and Deci (2001, p. 144) describe the hedonic position: “wellbeing consists of 
subjective happiness and concerns the experience of pleasure versus displeasure broadly 
construed to include all judgments about the good/bad elements of life.” Hedonic 
conceptualisations of wellbeing could be argued as being inherently subjective, as the 
ways that specific points in time are evaluated rely on a subjective assessment to 
determine the extent of the balance between pleasure and pain (Ryan & Deci, 2001). 
O’Neill (2006, p. 165) argues against this, because “our lives are not a series of events 
such that at any moment we can say now whether our lives are going well or badly.”  
With consideration to wellbeing for children, the hedonistic view of experience embodies 
a significant threat to individual long-term wellbeing, therefore illustrating important 
evidence to suggest that the baseline of wellbeing will be constantly and continuously 
increasing while not necessarily apparent to the individual. For example, an infant has a 
greater level of hedonistic endeavour than an adolescent, the latter who draws upon a 
range of inter-relational experiences where the affects of personality traits such as 
empathy and sympathy are developed. Hedonistic behaviour beyond infancy needs the 
mediating effects of positive personality traits such as empathy and sympathy to regulate 
any antisocial hedonic acts, which would therefore support a eudemonic assumption. 
Paradoxically, a eudemonic life view threatens a person’s developing wellbeing as it leads 
to contentment and satisfaction that may stifle self-fulfilment (Kashdan, Uswatte & 
Julian, 2006). Irrespective of the applied framework, from a life-span developmental 
perspective, neither a hedonic or eudemonic attribution adequately encapsulates the multi-
elemental constituents of wellbeing.  
It is apparent that wellbeing in its broadest sense encompasses all aspects of human 
experience but is representative of an individual’s state and potential holistically at a 
given point in time. In seeking an agreed definition of wellbeing, it is evident that 
wellbeing is: 
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 Multifaceted (Camfield, Streuli & Woodhead, 2009; Fraillon, 2004; Michalos, 
2008; Pollard & Lee, 2003) 
 Dependent on context (Crivello, Camfield & Woodhead, 2009; Fattore, Mason & 
Watson, 2007; Pollard & Lee, 2003) 
 Inclusive of social, economic, environmental, psychological, emotional, and 
cognitive components (Fraillon, 2004; Hattie, Myers & Sweeney, 2004; Hill, 
2004; Keyes & Lopez, 2002; Ryff & Singer, 1998; Schickler, 2005). 
Crivello, Camfield and Woodhead (2009 p. 53) assert that “wellbeing is a socially 
contingent, culturally anchored construct that changes over time, both in terms of 
individual life course changes as well as changes in socio-cultural context.” As such, 
wellbeing measures and policies do need continued evaluation and assessment to ensure 
the wellbeing needs of a society continue to be met. Furthermore, many characteristics 
commonly associated with wellbeing are ever changing and fluctuate dependent on the 
context and circumstance within which an individual finds him/herself (Fattore, Mason & 
Watson, 2007; Ryan & Travis, 1981; Weston, 1999). However, such refinement and 
evolution in terms of the constituent elements of wellbeing is not a sufficient argument for 
the absence of a definition. 
Rathi and Rastogi (2007 p. 32) suggested that wellbeing consists of “autonomy, 
environmental mastery, personal growth, positive relations with others, purpose in life 
and self-acceptance”, Hattie, Myers and Sweeney (2004 p. 363) posit that wellness 
consists of interconnected components within higher order dimensions of, “creative self, 
coping self, social self, essential self, and psychical self... [and] a way of life oriented 
toward optimal health and wellbeing in which mind, body and spirit are integrated by the 
individual to live life more fully”. Others argue that wellbeing is merely a “symptom of 
mental health” (Keyes & Lopez, 2002; La Placa, McNaught & Knight, 2013). While these 
concepts and definitions contain many of relevant components of wellbeing, they do not 
accurately describe all that is ‘wellbeing’. 
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A study by Schickler (2005 p. 221) found the term ‘wellbeing’ was used by participants to 
describe, “connotations of higher feelings, such as enjoyment and vitality, being in control 
of one’s life and of ethical congruity.” This description again associates wellbeing with 
feelings of positivity and aspiration, disregarding the reality that an individual's wellbeing 
can be both positive and compromised at any given time and is frequently reconstructed 
and fortified by both positive and negative experiences (Diener & Oishi, 2005; Kim-
Prieto et. al., 2005; Morgan et. al. 2007; Weston, 1999). This wellbeing “balancing” often 
occurs for example when physically ill patients can, and do report instances of 
experiencing positive wellbeing while being classified as being medically, physically or 
clinically ‘unwell’ (Cummins, 2005; Schickler, 2005). 
Beyond Subjectivity- Defining wellbeing 
The key constituent elements of wellbeing represent an intersecting triumvirate of the 
emotional, physical and cognitive self. As such, wellbeing should be viewed as the state 
of an individual as affected by these elements, within which, a range of descriptors reside.  
An individuals’ emotional wellbeing can include feelings such as happiness, satisfaction, 
worry, and anxiety; relationships with peers, family, teachers, significant others; 
psychological attributes such as depression; and social components of wellbeing such as 
the ability to make choices including one’s spirituality, quality of life and psychological 
disposition. Physical wellbeing includes environmental factors including global and local 
concerns, physical location, resources, socioeconomic status, financial stability, economic 
position, safety and security, home environment, and physical health. Cognitive wellbeing 
includes learning, memory, educational attainment, intellectual successes and failures.  
Finding a suitable and workable definition of wellbeing has particular relevance when 
considering children’s lives. With reference to children, Pollard and Lee (2003 p. 69) 
noted “wellbeing is often framed within a model of child deficits rather than a model of 
child strengths. As a result, researchers, policymakers, and practitioners may erroneously 
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focus research and intervention efforts on children’s deficits and discount the potential to 
identify and promote children’s strengths.” Children’s wellbeing is sometimes considered 
in terms of well becoming, defining the child as incomplete and undergoing preparation 
for adulthood (Crivello, Camfield & Woodhead, 2009; Fattore, Mason & Watson, 2007; 
Jones & Sumner, 2009). 
Accrued Wellbeing 
Based on a review of the relevant literature that considers wellbeing, subjective 
wellbeing, and mental health, a holistic and aspirational definition of wellbeing has been 
developed. By adopting a life stage/lifespan view of wellbeing, we have re-described the 
broader notion of wellbeing to recognise the process of accrual by individuals. We seek to 
bring greater recognition to the process of growth across the life span and define Accrued 
Wellbeing (AWB) as:  
an individual’s capacity to manage over time, the range of inputs, both 
constructive and undesirable that can, in isolation, affect a person’s emotional, 
physical and cognitive state in response to a given context.  
A key strength of Accrued Wellbeing is that it develops alongside the fluctuations of the 
threatened and heightened states of subjective wellbeing and continues to develop until 
death. AWB is informed and developed as individuals age and gather experience and as 
such maintains an exponential baseline. The recognition of wellbeing accrual across the 
lifespan represents an important consideration when developing support services relevant 
to individual’s life stage with reference to personal circumstance, environment, age, 
context, and experiences. Because AWB shifts the focus of the individual and those 
seeking to provide support services away from the restrictive and often emotional fragility 
of the short term subjective experience of wellbeing, it offers a superior and more 
workable set of experiential reference points from which to take action.  
Accrued Wellbeing (AWB) represents a primary state of wellbeing that influences how 
the individual responds to, and experiences a range of inputs or stimuli and indeed 
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recovers from experiences of low subjective wellbeing. Individuals’ self-assessment of 
wellbeing fluctuates according to the nature and degree of input at a given time, however, 
while the individuals’ subjective wellbeing may be threatened in the short term, a 
“moment-in-time” self-assessment of one’s own wellbeing may be a misleading indicator 
if the individuals’ Accrued Wellbeing (AWB) is not also considered. 
Within the above definition, the “individual” can represent a person, group, community, 
culture or society. As such, due recognition of the accrual process can assist and enable an 
informed and considered assessment of the underlying and sustained wellbeing as a 
“subject” seeks to manage the range of inputs in their particular context. 
Wellbeing “inputs” can include the physical, social, environmental, economic, cognitive 
and psychological, with each being influenced by the accrued experience of the individual 
and how the input has previously been acted upon (experienced) and how the individual 
seeks to act (informed response). The level of accrued wellbeing is particularly relevant 
when supporting individuals who believe themselves to be experiencing low wellbeing 
based on a subjective assessment. In-the-moment subjectivity may result in the individual 
placing disproportionate weight to the input, discounting the capacity building effects of 
the other factors and their level of Accrued Wellbeing such as social support, 
physiological health and economic condition. At these times the “individual” may believe 
they have no wellbeing, thereby ignoring the protective effects of other elements and may 
be supported by their community to recognise or work through the stressful experience.  
Cummins (2005) discussed the interplay of homeostatic buffers to support the 
maintenance of a generally positive subjective wellbeing and reinforces the importance of 
a balance between external protective factors such as wealth, and the internal buffers such 
as a positive sense of self. By considering the accrual process, wellbeing can be 
recognised as a state of continued evolution, changing over time, responding to and 
building on previous experiences and thereby influencing the individuals’ existing 
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awareness of their present state of wellbeing beyond the subjective state. Cummins and 
Nistico (2002) refer to a wellbeing set point from which an individual’s wellbeing either 
endures or worn away by external threats. While each of the inputs can affect the 
individual’s wellbeing in isolation, it is essential to consider the frequency and intensity 
of each input and how these elements can threaten or heighten the accrued elements of an 
individual’s wellbeing. From an accrual perspective it should be recognised that no 
threatening inputs can extinguish the individual’s overall wellbeing and indeed every 
experience both positive and negative, contributes to the accrual of experience as a 
protective factor. 
The definition provided above encompasses the ability for an individual to experience 
positive or negative aspects of any event, either independently or in any combination that 
resides within the wellbeing domain. As White (2007) discussed, the effect that both 
temporary and long-term situational changes have on an individual’s subjective wellbeing 
acknowledges that wellbeing is not a fixed concept. Moreover, accrued wellbeing is an 
enabler, a state of readiness and is capacity building. 
While the assessment of a person’s level of wellbeing can be ascertained either through 
observational analysis or self-report, given the variability of personal experience it will 
always maintain a level of subjectivity. An individual’s ability to experience ‘wellbeing’ 
is not determined by demographic and social characteristics such as age, gender, culture, 
class, experience, intelligence and ability and as such, it is essential that any established 
set of criteria remains independent from the impacts of short-term subjective variations. 
Because wellbeing exists in a state of continued and necessary conflict battling for 
resolution, the ongoing management of these conflicting effects serve to establish the 
more readily observed, yet still subjective, notions of resilience, confidence, happiness, 
emotional stability and coping. Further development of assessment criteria for identifying 
and individual’s AWB is warranted but such discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Accrued Wellbeing through childhood 
Accrued Wellbeing draws upon many of the skills and character traits developed in 
childhood; coping, problem solving, conflict resolution, self-efficacy, internal locus of 
control, autonomy and resilience. Of these, resilience is often considered as a critical 
protective factor when faced with the threatening inputs of life experience. In childhood, 
resilience is defined by “what differentiates the child who is vulnerable to negative 
outcomes from adversity, compared with the child who appears to cope despite 
adversity…the ability to ‘bounce back’ from stress, or ‘to recover from, adapt, and remain 
strong in the face of adversity” (Crivello, Camfield & Woodhead, 2009 p. 54).  
Resilience is a key life skill transferable into adulthood as Sen (1999, cited in Jones & 
Sumner, 2009 p. 42) noted, the “capabilities that adults enjoy are deeply conditional on 
their experiences as children.” Resilience however, does not equate to wellbeing but is 
both a contributor and result of wellbeing accrual. Wellbeing development throughout 
childhood and assisting children to recognise the accrual process as a protective strategy 
will not only aid in enabling children to experience a more optimistic and resilient 
childhood, but will also equip them with many of the key skills for the positive transition 
to adulthood (Sargeant, 2008).  
When considering the development (accrual) of wellbeing throughout childhood, Fattore, 
Mason and Watson (2007) identified the autonomy of children as an important contributor 
to this process. In their study the children identified the importance of being involved in 
decision-making processes (along with other characteristics) to the development of 
positive sense of wellbeing. Given this perspective, it is evident that school based 
wellbeing programs and other activities that purport to benefit its students, should include 
the consultation and collaboration with children as key stakeholders. 
Wellbeing is often cited as a main objective of interventions and preventative programs 
that focus on children and seek to continually refine their delivery, aiming to either 
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promote and enhance positive wellbeing practices, or reduce and eliminate negative 
wellbeing risk factors depending on their focus (Fraillon, 2004; Ryff, 1995). Within the 
education sector, many schools have adopted wellbeing policies guided by national, local 
and community expectations in order to promote children’s wellbeing. However, as with 
other fields that promote a wellbeing agenda, the variability in the available definitions of 
wellbeing presents challenges to the evaluations of these programs. As Pollard and Lee 
(2003 p. 62) note “wellbeing is a term that is commonly used but inconsistently defined in 
the study of child development” thus raising the question as to whether the wellbeing 
programs and policies currently in place in schools are actually enhancing the positive 
aspects of children’s wellbeing. While intervention and prevention programs are 
important, an acknowledgement of the accrual process explicit in our AWB definition will 
better guide the evaluation of the current processes that focus on children’s wellbeing. 
Hanafin et al. (2007 p. 79) acknowledge the “need to understand and represent the 
complexity and multi-dimensional nature of children’s lives in a way that is easily 
understood by different stakeholders” but without a clear and agreed understanding of 
wellbeing, researchers may, as Pollard and Lee (2003 p. 67) suggest “report that they are 
measuring a child’s wellbeing when in fact they are assessing a single domain or indicator 
of wellbeing, not recognising they are merely assessing one aspect of wellbeing.”  
Considering wellbeing as a state of readiness where an individual can thrive, repel, 
confront and cope with the information presented to them, it is apparent that these skills 
are rarely given due weight as relevant to children. There is a growing body of research 
involving children that reveals key evidence of the skills children apply to fulfil the tasks 
of childhood in the face of distressing experiences or exposure to the negative “adult 
world influences” (Gillett-Swan, 2013; Sargeant 2007, 2012) such as media, 
environmental concerns and global conflict. The mechanisms children apply such as their 
Importance Filter (Sargeant 2007) allows children to remain largely optimistic about their 
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future, despite being surrounded by seemingly negative societal inputs, supports the 
notion that even in the early years of childhood, wellbeing is being accrued.  
The process of wellbeing accrual while primarily useful to support the individual in 
forming objective and optimistic self assessments throughout the life span has particular 
relevance in childhood as the child’s resilience, perspective and capacity is being 
formulated through a range of experiences. It enables competence, recognition, autonomy, 
personal power (not powerlessness), purposefulness in addition to the development of 
physical, emotional, and social skills (Fattore, Mason & Watson, 2007). Involving 
children as active contributors to enhancing their wellbeing and experiences of childhood 
will enable adults to gain authentic insight into what it is to be a child in contemporary 
society and assist their recognition of their own accruing wellbeing. These inclusive 
practices will provide the vital information needed to assist children and young people to 
successfully negotiate the key transitions through life. It is evident that younger children 
tend to be more optimistic about their lives and futures compared with those in 
adolescence (Sargeant, 2005; 2007), and if guided, adults may develop a better 
understanding of children’s wellbeing and its development through the accrual process 
beyond either party’s subjectivity.  
When considering Accrued Wellbeing at any point in an individual’s life stage, the 
definition will assist in not only helping individual to recognise their built capacities of 
resilience, health and emotional strength in order to address short term subjective 
pressures, but it also represents a futures focus for individuals at times when a positive 
subjective wellbeing is felt. The futured notion of Accrued Wellbeing can have particular 
relevance in preventative health and wellbeing education programs targeted at school 
aged children to reinforce the importance of healthy and lifelong lifestyle habits. The 
AWB definition should be shared with even young children as they develop a focus on 
healthy behaviours. By returning to the AWB definition regularly throughout childhood 
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and across the lifespan with reference to a set of accrued wellbeing indicators, each 
individual can participate in mapping their own accrued wellbeing. These indicators and 
the mapping activities are currently in development. 
Conclusion 
Wellbeing is a highly popularised and aspirational concept in philosophical, 
psychological, medical and health literature yet there has not yet been a clearly defined 
and workable definition of wellbeing that incorporates its multifaceted, multidimensional 
and progressive elements. As such wellbeing programs remain at risk of ineffective 
application. By identifying the key elements of wellbeing and recognising the process of 
accrual that sits alongside other more temporary wellbeing affectations as described in the 
presented definition of Accrued Wellbeing, a more holistic and foundational 
understanding of wellbeing can emerge. Such understanding will resolve the perceived 
conflicts between the interplay of the wellbeing elements, the impact of context, and the 
capacity for wellbeing to fluctuate within an individual’s subjective state. Acknowledging 
the presence of Accrued Wellbeing alongside the more unstable but popularly applied 
subjective wellbeing will enable helping professionals to recognise an individual’s AWB 
and better provide socially and personally relevant support, from which outcomes can be 
measured against common criteria. The benefits of considering wellbeing as a process of 
accrual resides in the ability to build upon the physical, psychological and life experiences 
to inform the future direction of wellbeing. When working with children however, the 
benefits of life experience are not as vast as those in the adult population. By 
understanding wellbeing as a process of accrual in childhood adds a facilitative element to 
the process. Children can be assisted in their navigation of childhood by the key adults 
involved in their lives such as parents, teachers and other helping professionals. However 
it should also be noted that the results of such supportive guidance may not be identified 
until a later stage in life when assessing a person’s accrued wellbeing. By defining 
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wellbeing in terms of the state of an individual affected by the immediate and the accrued 
emotional, physical and cognitive life experiences, responsive support services, 
particularly for children may be more effectively directed. 
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